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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MOORE V U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: A POSSIBLE EXPANSION OF CONGRESSMEN'S STANDING TO SUE

In Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives,I the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit addressed the question of whether individual congressmen have standing to sue the
Congress. In Moore, members of the House of Representatives
sought declaratory relief to invalidate the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA). 2 The congressmen contended
that TEFRA originated in the Senate in violation of the origination
clause of the United States Constitution, 3 which requires that bills
for raising revenue originate in the House of Representatives.
Although the District of Columbia Circuit ultimately denied relief
on the basis of prudential considerations, 4 it held, significantly, that
the congressmen had standing to bring suit in federal court. 5 Thus,
the Moore court determined that the federal court had jurisdiction
over the controversy but that, because of prudential concerns, that
power should not be exercised.
Part I of this comment outlines the facts and holding of Moore.
Part II examines the standing analysis which the court employed
and concludes that the Moore court's finding of standing does not
comport with traditional tests for standing. Finally, Part III discusses the court's decision to deny relief based on prudential considerations. This comment concludes that, contrary to the Moore
holding, denial of relief should have been the consequence of constitutional command rather than judicial discretion.
I.

Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives

In December 1981, the House of Representatives approved
H.R. 4961, a bill which would amend the Internal Revenue Code to
reduce tax revenues. 6 The Senate substantially amended the bill
and renamed it "The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
1982" (TEFRA). As amended, the bill, rather than reducing tax
revenues, proposed to significantly increase tax revenues. This
change prompted Representative Rousselot, one of the plaintiffs in
Moore, to propose a resolution in the House stating that the Sen1 733 F.2d 946, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1984), petitionfor cert.
filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3372 (U.S. Nov.
13, 1984) (No. 84-389).
2 Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324.
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
4 733 F.2d at 956.
5 Id.
6 H.R. 4961, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H9607-10 (daily ed. Dec. 15,
1981).
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ate's amendments violated the origination clause of the Constitution. 7 The House voted to table Rousselot's resolution. 8 Each of
the plaintiffs, eighteen members of the 97th Congress, voted
against the motion to table. 9 The House then voted to send the bill
to a Senate conference without first referring it back to the House
Committee on Ways and Means. Again, the plaintiffs were outvoted.10 In August 1982, TEFRA passed both the House and Sen2
ate;" all plaintiffs voted against its passage.'
The plaintiffs brought suit in federal district court against the
House, the Senate, and certain officers of both bodies,' 3 seeking a
declaratory judgment that TEFRA unconstitutionally originated in
the Senate in violation of the origination clause. The district court
dismissed the complaint, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing,
and alternatively, that in the court's remedial discretion, declaratory relief should be withheld.' 4 The court of appeals affirmed,
agreeing with the district court's dismissal based upon prudential
concerns. Significantly, however, the court of appeals held that the
legislators had standing to sue in federal court.' 5
7 H.R. Res. 541, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H4776 (daily ed. July 28,
1982). The resolution provides:
Resolved, that the Senate Amendments to the bill, H.R. 4961, in the opinion of the
House, contravene the first clause of the seventh section of the first article of the
Constitution of the United States, and are an infringement of the privileges of this
House and that the said bill, with amendments be respectfully returned to the Senate with a message communicating this resolution.
8 Id. at H4776-77. A vote to table a resolution results in suspending consideration of
the resolution.
9 The plaintiffs were:
Laurence E. Craig, R-ID
Edward Bethune, R-AR
Philip M. Crane, R-IL
Daniel B. Crane, R-IL
Carroll Hubbard, Jr., D-KY
Billy Lee Evans, D-GA
Elliot H. Levitas, D-GA
James Jeffries, R-KS
Lawrence P. McDonald, D-GA
James G. Martin, R-NC
Stephen L. Neal, D-NC
W. Henson Moore, R-LA
John H. Rousselot, R-CA
Ron Paul, R-TX
Richard T. Schulze, R-PA
James D. Santini, D-NV
Bob Stump, D-AZ
Richard C. Shelby, D-AL
Telephone conversation with the clerk's office of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit (September 18, 1984).
10 H.R. Res. 541, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H4786-87 (daily ed. July 28,
1982).
11 H.R. Con. Res. 398, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S10946, H6635-36 (daily
ed. July 28, 1982).
12 Id. at H6635-36.
13 Named as co-defendants in the suit were: Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., the Speaker of the
House; George Bush, the President of the Senate; Edmund L. Henshaw, Jr., the Clerk of
the House; and William F. Hildenbrand, the Secretary of the Senate. Moore, 733 F.2d at
948.
14 Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 553 F. Supp. 267, 271 (1982).
15 Moore, 733 F.2d at 956.
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II.

The Moore Court's Standing Analysis

In determining that the congressmen had standing, the Moore
court applied the four pronged test which the Supreme Court announced in Valley Forge ChristianCollege v. Americans Unitedfor Separation of Church and State, Inc. 16 Under Valley Forge, a plaintiff has
standing when: (a) "he personally has suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the
defendant;"' 7 (b) his injury falls within the "zone of interests" protected by the constitutional provision allegedly violated;' 8 (c) the
injury "can be traced to the challenged action" of the defendant;' 9
and (d) the injury is "likely to be redressed by a favorable decision"
of the court. 20 The Valley Forge Court recognized the complexity of
standing, noting that "the concept cannot be reduced to a one-sentence or one-paragraph definition." 2' The Court, however, declared, "of one thing we may be sure: those who do not possess
Art. III standing may not litigate as suitors in the courts of the
United States." 2 2 Thus, if the plaintiff lacks standing, the court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction because there is no "case or controversy" within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution.
In addressing the first prong of the Valley Forge analysis, the
court of appeals concluded that the congressional plaintiffs had alleged a "specific injury in fact to a cognizable legal interest." 2 3 The
court, however, recognized that suits brought by congressmen
against coordinate branches of government present separation of
24
powers concerns which may affect standing in the federal courts.
Therefore, the court required that the representatives' alleged in25
jury be "specific and cognizable" in order to give rise to standing.
The court ruled that denial of the opportunity to debate and vote
on the origination of legislation, in a manner prescribed by the
Constitution, inflicted a "specific and concrete" injury on the
26
plaintiffs.
Although the Moore court included separation of powers concerns as a factor in its search for a specific injury in fact to each
16
17

454 U.S. 464 (1982).
Id. at 472 (quoting Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99

(1979)).
18 Id. at 475.
19 Id. at 472 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38
(1976)).

20 Id.
21
22
23
24

Id. at 475.
Id. at 475-76.
Moore, 733 F.2d at 951.
Id.

25 Id.
26

Id. at 952.

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:417

plaintiff, the court emphasized that standing and the political question doctrine are distinct tenets. 27 Specifically, the court cautioned
against an encroachment into standing analysis by political question concerns. The court warned that such an intrusion would
"greatly curtail the exercise of federal court jurisdiction over mat28
ters that touch upon a coordinate branch of government."
The court of appeals readily disposed of the remaining prongs
of the standing test. In addressing the second prong, the court relied on its previous holdings that congressmen have standing to sue
to assert violations of constitutionally prescribed procedure. 29 The
Moore court concluded that an individual congressman's right to initiate legislation is within the "zone of interests" protected by the
30
origination clause.
The Moore court determined that the congressional plaintiffs
satisfied the third prong of the Valley Forge test because the injury
was "traceable to the challenged actions of the defendants." 3 1 The
plaintiffs' alleged injury, the unconstitutional denial of the chance
to debate and vote on the origination of TEFRA, occurred exclusively within the legislative branch. Both the House and Senate enacted the disputed legislation. Thus, according to the court, the
alleged injury was traceable to the defendants' actions. Finally, the
Moore court held that the court's power to grant declaratory and
injunctive relief provided sufficient capacity to redress the claimed
32
injury, thereby satisfying the fourth prong of the Valley Forge test.
Moore's holding that the representatives had standing to sue the
Congress may provide congressmen greater accessibility to the federal courts. 33 But, the court's decision to address a dispute con27

Id. at 953.

28 Id.
29 The court refers to Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), vacated
on other grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) and Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
30 The "zone of interests" requirement, as its language suggests, is intended to be generously applied. The requirement seeks primarily to eliminate from adjudication cases in
which the connection between the purpose of the protection and the interest asserted is too
tenuous to justify judicial determination on that basis. Therefore, "the challenging party
need only show that it is an intended beneficiary of the statute and not necessarily the
primary one." Constructores Civiles de Centroamerica v. Hannah, 459 F.2d 1183, 1189
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
31 Moore, 733 F.2d at 954.
32 Redressability has been characterized as "the connection between the alleged injury
and the action requested of the court." Community Nutrition Inst. v. Block, 698 F.2d 1239,
1248 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Further, the requirement is not that the injury will certainly be
redressed but rather that it "is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." Valley Forge,
454 U.S. at 472 (1981) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38
(1976)).
33 For purposes of standing analysis, the court assumes the validity of the plaintiffs
claim and, without addressing the merits, construes the complaint in the plaintiffs favor.
See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). Thus, the holding in Moore is not limited to
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fined to the legislative branch, brought by lawmakers who debated
and voted on the contested legislation, may circumvent the requirement that a plaintiff suffer a specific injury in fact. For example, in
Moore, each plaintiff alleged a violation of his constitutional right to
participate as a representative of the House in the origination of revenue raising legislation.3 4 Yet, Congress settled this dispute to the
satisfaction of a majority of its members in a manner consistent with
its established procedures.3 5 Furthermore, the Moore court recognized that suits brought by congressional plaintiffs against a branch
of the government "pose separation-of-powers concerns which may
affect a complainant's standing." 36 Perhaps this concern should be
emphasized when an individual congressman alleges an injury to
his office although the Congress finds no harm.3 7 As noted in the
concurring opinion in Goldwater v. Carter,3 8 "[w]here Congress itthe enactment of legislation in violation of the origination clause. Rather, the court required an injury to an "interest positively identified by the Constitution." Moore, 733 F.2d
at 95 1. As noted in the concurring opinion, the courts, following Moore, could resolve disputes between legislators concerning any constitutional provision that regulates legislative
procedures. Id. at 958. For example, article I, section 5, clause 4 of the Constitution provides that "[n]either House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the consent of
the other, adjourn for more than three days." And article I, section 4, clause 4 states that
"[t]he Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate." Moore permits
a congressional plaintiff to allege a personal injury resulting from violation of either provision and have standing to sue the Congress in the federal courts.
34 Although the plaintiffs alleged that they were denied the opportunity to participate
in the origination of TEFRA, the legislative history casts some doubt on their claim. First,
H.R. 4961, although substantially altered by the Senate, did in fact originate in the House
and was passed by the House on December 15, 1981. H.R. 4961, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 127
CONG. REC. H9607-10 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1981). TEFRA retained the House number in the
Senate. Second, the plaintiffs voted against the motion to table Representative Rousselot's
resolution, which alleged that TEFRA unconstitutionally originated in the Senate. They
voted against the motion to send TEFRA to Senate conference, and they voted against
enacting TEFRA as legislation. See notes 8, 10, 12 supra. The district court noted: "Plaintiffs fully participated in the legislative process which culminated in the passage of the act
they now challenge. They were simply outvoted." Moore, 553 F. Supp. at 270.
35 On July 28, 1982, the House voted to table Representative Rousselot's resolution,
which alleged that TEFRA unconstitutionally originated in the Senate. H.R. Res. 541, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H4776-77 (daily ed. July 28, 1982). Also on July 28, the
House voted to send TEFRA to conference with the Senate, after debate on the constitutionality of the Senate's amendments to TEFRA. Id. at H4777-88. Finally, TEFRA passed
both houses on August 19, 1982. H.R. Con. Res. 541, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG.
REC. S10946, H6635-36 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1982).
36 Moore, 733 F.2d at 951.
37 The concurring opinion, disagreeing with the court's conclusion that the plaintiffs
had standing, noted:
[W]e sit here neither to supervise the internal workings of the executive and legislative branches nor to umpire disputes between those branches regarding their
respective powers. Unless and until those internal workings . . . brings forth a
result that harms private rights, it is no part of our constitutional province, which
is "solely, to decide on the rights of individuals."
Id. at 959 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170
(1803)).
38 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
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self, and not the Executive, renders an individual legislator's vote
39
ineffective, the courts have no role."
Although the Moore court focused considerable attention on
whether the plaintiffs had sustained "injury in fact," 40 the court
rather summarily disposed of the other Valley Forge criteria, 4 1 including the zone of interests analysis. 4 2 The court's disposition of
this latter criterion may prove to be the most significant aspect of
Moore in future litigation. Injury in fact analysis involves a determination that concrete harm has occurred. 43 Therefore, the nature of
the inquiry is factual and necessarily dependent on the circumstances of the particular case. That the injury is within the zone of
interests protected by the Constitution, on the other hand, looks to
the nature of that injury. In finding that a particular type of injury
is protected, the court directly adjusts the constitutional limits to its
jurisdiction. Thus, by expressly stating that the "interests of individual legislators were within the zone of interests protected by
constitutional provisions," 44 the Court of Appeals for the District of
45
Columbia Circuit has expanded congressional standing.
Though the nature of the injury protected in Moore may prove
crucial in future litigation, the court did not delineate which of the
plaintiffs' specific interests the Senate may have violated by allegedly originating TEFRA. Prior congressional standing cases enumerate three basic interests that congressmen have in a
constitutionally prescribed procedure: the interest of congressmen
39 Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 712 (Wright, J., concurring).
40 Moore, 733 F.2d at 951.
41 Id. at 953-54.
42 Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475. As noted earlier, see note 30 supra, the zone of interests
requirement has received generous application. But, the requirement has remained essential to the analysis, preventing standing where the interest asserted is either so common to
people generally or so indirectly the result of constitutional infringement that the injury
could not serve as a basis ofjudicial precedent. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
43 Moore, 733 F.2d at 951.
44 Id. at 953-54.
45 Both Goldwater, 617 F.2d 697, and Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir.
1974), upon which the court relies to establish a zone of interest, see Moore, 733 F.2d at 954
n.36, involved controversies between separate branches of government. Moore is distinguishable. MVoore presents an action by congressmen against the Congress; therefore, the
case does not involve the necessities for judicial determination reflected in the previous
decisions. In Moore, alternative means of redress were available within the Congress itself.
Congress as a body recognized the possible deviation from congressional priority but voted
to table Representative Rousselot's resolution. See Moore, 733 F.2d at 949. Thus, without
expressly saying so, the court has asserted jurisdiction beyond the precedential basis.
Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 444
U.S. 996 (1979), involved a suit by members of Congress challenging the President's unilateral termination of a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan allegedly in violation of the treaty's
provisions.
Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974), involved a suit by Senator Kennedy challenging an alleged "pocket veto" of S. 3418 in violation of article I, section 7 of
the Constitution.
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as representatives of individual citizens; the interest of congressmen as representatives of Congress as an institution; and the individual interests of congressmen as private plaintiffs asserting
personal rights. Apparently, the last of these interests is the injury
which the Moore court found.
One of the interests that the origination clause 46 protects is the
right of citizens to have taxing authority restricted by the powers of
popular vote. 47 Neither the district court4 nor the court of appeals 49 denied that private plaintiffs would have standing to challenge TEFRA. In this respect, the congressmen may have been
acting as representatives of the people. Prior to Moore, however,
courts relied on prudential considerations to deny representative
plaintiffs standing to sue. 50 Recognizing the risks of insufficient
representation of the third party's interest and the possibility that
the third party may not want the suit litigated, courts have required
the plaintiff to show an independent basis for asserting standing to
sue. -5 1 This independent basis is usually concrete personal injury to
the plaintiff. Therefore, a congressman's status as representative of
the people alone should not be enough to establish standing.
Though the injury to the public is within the constitutionally protected zone of interest, an individual congressman may not assert
the public interest without personal injury.
46 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
47 The origination clause derived from the fear of delegates of the larger states at the
Constitutional Convention that if revenue raising power were placed in the Senate, the
smaller states, because of equal representation, would have disproportionate control of the
purse strings. The theory behind the clause is that national taxing authority should be
placed in the legislative branch which is more responsive to popular opinion. The House of
Representatives satisfied this goal in two respects. First, the House was selected more often
and therefore more sensitive to public influence. Second, the House provided a better
forum for debate-members were both more numerous and more representative of national popular vote. But, in the bargaining and compromise of the convention, the Senate
was given almost unlimited power to amend or reject revenue bills. Therefore, the power
remaining in the House over revenue bills consisted solely in their origination. Many argue
that their power is still significant in that it effectively gives the House the power to "set the
legislative agenda." That is, by originating revenue bills, the House effectively controls the
structure and direction of legislative debate. See, Comment, The OriginationClause, the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, and the Role of the Judiciaiy, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 419
(1983). See generally C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1928).
48 Moore, 553 F. Supp. at 271-72.
49 Moore, 733 F.2d at 956.
50 "[T]he plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot
rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties." Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 499 (1975); see Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (involving taxpayer
standing).
51 See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 199 n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Harrington
court recognized this approach to standing as "derivative" and in regard to asserting such a
claim recognized that "it may make it substantially more difficult to meet the minimum
requirements of Art. III ....
553 F.2d at 199 n.41 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 504-05 (1975)).
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A second possible basis for standing in Moore is that violation
of the origination clause injured the Congress as an institution and
thereby injured the congressional plaintiffs as members of that institution. 52 Arguably, Congress is an intended beneficiary of the
origination clause, 5 3 but the Congress elected not to enforce its
right to strike down TEFRA. 54 Thus, this justification is also without merit.
Therefore, it appears that the court's decision was substantially
based on personal injury to the congressmen. As previously discussed, however, it is difficult to conceptualize how this harm is
within the zone of interests protected by the origination clause. As
Judge Scalia argued in his concurring opinion, "the authority
[under the origination clause] was conferred for the benefit not of
the governors but the governed."5 5 Thus, Moore's holding that the
harm is within the zone of interests protected by the origination
clause will create an unwarranted and unconstitutional expansion
of federal jurisdiction in suits brought by congressmen.
III.

The Moore Court's Remedial Discretion Analysis

Although the Moore court found that the congressional plaintiffs had standing to challenge the constitutionality of TEFRA, it
nevertheless chose to abstain from awarding declaratory relief to
the congressmen. 5 6 The basis of the court's abstention was the
doctrine of remedial discretion.5 7 The court indicated that "when a
congressional plaintiff's dispute is primarily with other members of
Congress and when private plaintiffs would have standing to challenge the allegedly unconstitutional conduct, the doctrine of remedial discretion counsels judicial restraint in affording the
congressional plaintiff declaratory or injunctive relief.' ' 5 8 This
comment concludes, as noted earlier, that the congressional plaintiffs in Moore lacked standing. A proper review of the use of equitable discretion, however, must proceed under the assumption that
the plaintiffs had standing to sue the Congress.
The Moore court's use of equitable discretion to abstain from
awarding declaratory relief is significant because it will hinder congressional plaintiffs in seeking a remedy for their violated rights. In
52 At a minimum, Congress has an interest in the origination clause inasmuch as the
clause promotes an orderly process for legislating revenue bills.
53 Plaintiffs also asserted injury as members of the House Ways and Means Committee.
The Constitution, however, provides no specific protection for this committee as a body
and protest must be on other grounds.
54 See Moore, 733 F.2d at 960 (Scalia, J., concurring).
55 Id.
56 Moore, 733 F.2d at 956.
57 Id.
58 Id.
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using the equitable discretion doctrine, the Moore court followed its
decision in Riegle v. Federal Open Market Committee 59 and its subsequent related decisions in Vanderjagt v. O'Neill 60 and Crockett v. Reagan. 61 In Riegle, VanderJagt, and Crockett, the District of Columbia
Circuit held that when legislative remedies are available to a congressional plaintiff, the court must dismiss the case on the basis of
prudential concerns. 6 2 Thus, because the Moore court found that
the plaintiffs could vindicate their rights through the enactment, repeal, or amendment of TEFRA,63 it affirmed dismissal of the case
on the basis of prudential concerns. The Moore court, however,
overstated the availability of such a remedy. To obtain legislative
redress, congressional plaintiffs must persuade the majority of their
colleagues to amend or repeal the bill at issue. This task is almost
insurmountable since congressional plaintiffs typically represent a
small minority of all the congressmen. Because legislative redress
is likely to be unsuccessful for the congressional plaintiffs, they are
left with a violated right and no remedy. The law of equity was
created to avoid such a situation, not produce it.64
The standards to employ in determining whether to abstain, on
the basis of equitable discretion, in a congressional plaintiff case
were first set forth in Riegle. 65 The Riegle court developed a twoprong standard, holding that when (1) the congressional plaintiffs
can attain legislative redress, and (2) a private plaintiff may bring a
similar action, prudential concerns counsel for dismissal of the con66
gressional plaintiffs' action.
In analyzing the subsequent application of the Riegle standards,
it is apparent that the District of Columbia Circuit has failed to consistently apply such standards. VanderJagtand Moore exemplify this
inconsistency. In VanderJagt, fourteen Republican members of the
House of Representatives sued the Democratic leaders of the
House. The Republican members contended that the Democrats
had systematically discriminated against them by providing them
with fewer seats on House committees and subcommittees than
they were proportionally due. 6 7 The court dismissed the entire
case despite the fact that the Republicans had sued in their individual capacities as voters. 68 In noting the court's inconsistency with
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).
699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 91 (1983).
720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Moore, 733 F.2d at 956.
Id. at 955.
Id. at 962 n.9 (Scalia, J., concurring).
656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).
Id. at 882.
699 F.2d at 1167.
Id. at 1168.
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Riegle, Judge Bork, in his concurring opinion in Vander Jagt,
indicated:
If they were applying Riegle, my colleagues would dismiss the
action by plaintiffs in their capacities as legislators because legislative redress is available and a similar action could be brought
by a private plaintiff. But they could not dismiss the entire action since there are private plaintiffs before us: the congressmen also sued in their capacities as voters and as representatives
of the classes of all voters represented in the House by
Republicans .69
Rather than rely on the principled rationale of Riegle, the VanderJagt
court withheld declaratory relief due to "the startlingly unattractive" idea of telling the Speaker of the House of Representatives
what he must do to comply with the Constitution.7 0 Such a rationale lacks the "general applicability" which Judge McGowan argued
was necessary to properly use equitable discretion. 7'
Moore continues the inconsistent application of the equitable
discretion doctrine. In Moore, the court indicated it could withhold
"declaratory relief regardless of the availability of other forms of
relief." 72 This approach varies from that outlined by the United
States Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris73 where the Court stated
that "courts of equity should not act . . . when the moving party
has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury
74
if denied equitable relief."
Although the majority in Moore indicated that the congressional
plaintiffs did have other available judicial remedies, the court did
not elaborate. 7 5 Whatever adequate remedies at law the congressional plaintiffs may have had in Moore were denied when the court
dismissed the case. Furthermore, given the substantial barriers to
legislative redress, it is apparent that the plaintiffs have suffered ir69 Id. at 1183 (Bork, J., concurring).
70 Id. at 1176.
71 See McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintifls, 15 GA. L. REV. 241, 251 (1981).
McGowan contends that the standing doctrine is difficult to apply in congressional plaintiff
cases due to the doctrine's inability to reflect separation of powers concerns that are inherent in such cases. He argues that the political question doctrine is incapable of resolving
congressional plaintiff cases due to its inherent deceptiveness and its general disfavor
among judicial and academic authorities. He further contends that the ripeness doctrine is
inappropriate in congressional plaintiff cases because, like the standing doctrine, it fails to
consider the separation of powers concerns prevalent in congressional plaintiff cases.
Moore, 733 F.2d at 955.
72 Moore, 733 F.2d at 955.
73 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
74 Id. at 43-44.
75 Moore, 733 F.2d at 954. It should be noted thatiudge Scalia contends in his concurring opinion that the plaintiffs do not have any other available judicial relief. Id. at 962 n.9.
If so, the majority has extended the use of equitable discretion well beyond its originally
intended use.
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reparable injury because the court refused to grant declaratory relief. Thus, the Moore court failed to apply the equitable discretion
doctrine developed in Younger and later extended in Riegle to congressional plaintiff cases. The District of Columbia Circuit should
have provided clear and concise principles, capable of consistent
application, for employing equitable discretion in congressional
plaintiff cases.
IV. Conclusion
In holding that the congressmen had standing to sue in the
federal courts, the Moore court has made the federal courts more
accessible to congressional plaintiffs. By alleging an injury to the
right to debate and vote in Congress, a potential congressional
plaintiff will meet the requirement of standing and thus confer jurisdiction upon the federal court. Moore, perhaps unintentionally,
allows congressional plaintiffs to overcome the difficult jurisdictional requirement, leaving only the less difficult equitable discretion hurdle. In essence, congressmen will not have to convince the
court that it has jurisdiction. After Moore, congressmen need only
convince a court that it should exercise its jurisdiction. It appears,
however, that the Moore court circumvented the requirement that
the congressional plaintiffs suffer a concrete and specific injury
within the zone of interests protected by the origination clause.
The court in Moore should have dismissed the case not because of
prudential concerns, but rather because the plaintiffs lacked standing, a prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction.
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